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Abstract Defensive decision making occurs when a manager ranks an option as the
best for the organization yet deliberately chooses a second-best option that protects
him or herself against negative consequences. We study 950 managers in a public
administration to analyze the frequency and causes of defensive decisions. We find
that at each hierarchy level defensive decisions are widespread. On average, 2.5 out
of the 10 most important decisions respondents made within the last 12 months
were defensive. Overall, 80% of managers indicated that they made at least one
defensive decision and 17% even stated that at least half of their decisions were
defensive. We identify as a major cause a team’s approach to failure, that is,
whether the reaction to failure is to seek someone to blame as opposed to identifying
the underlying causes in order to learn how to prevent similar failures in the future.
Given that managers are often confronted with an uncertain environment where a
positive outcome cannot be ascertained, such an approach to failure can lead to a
severe decline in the performance of the organization.
Keywords Managerial decision making  Defensive behavior  Failure 
Organizational culture
1 C. Y. A.
One of the services that consulting firms provide to the public and private sector is
to back up management decisions often referred to as C. Y. A. or ‘‘cover your
ass’’—a term widely used in the managerial world and now even listed in the
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Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms (Ayto 2010). That is, managers call in a
consulting firm even though they have already made up their mind what to do. In the
event of failure, however, the consulting firm serves as a scapegoat and managers
can avoid blame. Such managerial decisions are defensive; the best option for the
organization would be to avoid spending money on the consulting firm and
instead have managers stand up for their personal decisions.
Defensive decisions are by no means limited to hiring a consulting firm but can
be encountered across many domains and organizations. They occur when
professionals opt for the second-best option rather than (what they believe to be)
the best option for their organization or client in order to protect themselves from
potential negative consequences in the future. Defensive decisions are only one
strategy found within the broader framework of defensive behavior with its long
tradition of theoretical work (Argyris 1977, 1985, 1990; Ashforth and Lee 1990).
Within research on defensive behavior, empirical work has so far focused on the
notion of organizational silence. This refers to situations where employees do not
dare to speak up to superiors about certain issues or problems (e.g., Bowen and
Blackmon 2003; Detert and Edmondson 2011; Dyne et al. 2003; Henriksen and
Dayton 2006; Homburg and Fu¨rst 2007; Morrison and Milliken 2000, 2003; Park
and Keil 2009; for a review, see Morrison 2014). Milliken et al. (2003) found that
85% of employees experienced such a situation at least once at their firm.
Defensive decision making is related to but goes beyond mere organizational
silence. Defensive decision making is characterized by activity as opposed to mere
silence, that is, by actively taking or recommending the second-best option for the
organization to protect oneself from potential negative consequences. In addi-
tion, defensive decision making occurs before the fact where the decision maker
faces potentially positive and negative future outcomes. Such situations are
characterized either by risk, where all options, possible outcomes, and their
probabilities are known, or uncertainty, where full information on options, out-
comes, and probabilities is lacking. Risk and, to an even greater extent, uncertainty
are key characteristics of a managerial decision making environment (Artinger et al.
2015; Knight 1921). Unlike organizational silence, defensive decision making does
not focus on subordinate employees and decisions when facing superiors. Rather,
defensive decisions can occur in all constellations, including among peers, by
superiors when facing subordinates, and vice versa.
Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence on defensive decision making in
organizations, only Gigerenzer (2014) provides initial evidence that it might also be
of significance in managerial decision making. So far, defensive decision making
has been studied in the medical domain (e.g., Anderson 1999; Bishop et al. 2010;
JacksonHealthcare 2009; Kessler and McClellan 1996; Summerton 1995). Studdert
et al. (2005), for instance, find that 93% of US doctors engage in some form of
defensive decision making such as ordering clinically unnecessary MRIs, CTs,
antibiotics, and surgery. Defensive decision making in medicine occurs primarily in
order to avoid blame and the negative repercussions associated with it, including its
most severe form, litigation. Ashforth and Lee (1990) list the avoidance of blame as
one of the motives for defensive behavior more generally but also point to the
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avoidance of change and the avoidance of action. These motives are not mutually
exclusive.
Defensive decision making is not the same as risk aversion in that it can also lead
to excessive risk taking. Part of the crowd behavior of financial investors in the
years before the financial crisis of 2008 is a case in point. A manager who feels that
an investment is overvalued and likely will depreciate in the next years, but
nevertheless invests because everyone else is doing so exposes the company unduly
to risks (Gigerenzer 2014). The problem is not simply risk aversion or seeking, but
rather the mechanisms in place that encourage taking the best decision.
This paper quantifies the extent of defensive decisions in a large public
administration with a sample of 950 managers. We investigate the influence of
team’s ‘approach to failure’ and ‘employee voice’ on defensive decision making.
Finally, we present and examine examples of defensive decision making provided
by survey participants, why it occurs, and possible countermeasures.
2 Hypotheses
The context in which the individual operates is often a central driving force for the
choice of a decision strategy (Simon 1956). We therefore focus on how differences
in the environment in which the decision maker is situated interact with the
frequency of defensive decisions.
2.1 Approach to failure
A defining element of defensive decisions is that the decision maker faces a
situation with potentially positive or negative future outcomes. Even a decision that
relies on the best and most reliable process can fail. In organizations where failures
are wrongly attributed to the decision maker, managers feel threatened and in need
of protecting themselves. Moreover, such an approach to failure impedes learning
because it often incentivizes choosing the safe option (for oneself, not the
organization) and avoids exploring new alternatives where the outcome is uncertain.
This is when defensive decisions arise. In an environment that understands the
inherent risk or uncertainty of many managerial decisions, managers face much less
pressure to decide defensively. Besides gaining an understanding of such risk and
uncertainty, it is important to learn jointly from failure, particularly when it occurs
systematically (Burmeister-Lamp et al. 2012; Klarner et al. 2013). Two related
concepts cover the main aspects of a team’s approach to failure: psychological
safety (Edmondson 1999) and error culture (van Dyck et al. 2005).
Psychological safety refers to a shared belief held by members of a team that the
team is a safe place for interpersonal risk taking (Carroll and Edmondson 2002;
Edmondson 1999; for a review see Edmondson and Lei 2014). It involves but goes
beyond interpersonal trust and mutual respect. For example, in a team with a high
level of psychological safety people will not be rejected for making a mistake. The
team climate is characterized by a sense of confidence that the team will not
embarrass or punish someone for admitting failures or insecurities. Although
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psychological safety can be studied at the individual, team, and organizational level,
some findings suggest that psychological safety is essentially a team-level
phenomenon: Edmondson and Lei (2014), for instance, report significant differences
in the interpersonal climate of psychological safety between teams within the same
organization.
Error culture has been identified primarily as a construct at the level of the
organization [for a review see van Dyck et al. (2005)]. It refers to the shared
practices and procedures aimed at managing error within an organization. Common
practices include communicating about failures, sharing knowledge how failures
occur, and helping in situations that are failure prone (Mathieu et al. 2000). In a
negative error culture, errors must not occur. If an error does occur, one tries to hide
it, and if that does not work, someone is blamed for it. As a result, errors continue to
happen. In a positive error culture, occasional errors are expected because of
inherent uncertainty; if an error occurs, it is taken as useful information to determine
and eliminate the causes, with the result of reducing errors (Gigerenzer 2014).
Scales for error culture contain many items which can severely hinder their
implementation in an organizational context where only limited time is available
[for instance Rybowiak et al. (1999) contains 38 items; van Dyck et al. (2005) which
is the most widely cited scale contains 28 items].
Approach to failure combines elements from psychological safety (how safe it is
to take interpersonal risks) and error culture (how one deals with the occurrence
of error and failure) at the team level in a single scale consisting of only eight items.
In contrast to error culture, approach to failure relates not only to risk but also
uncertainty. Just as in psychological safety, it is the team climate that centrally
regulates how people deal with failures. In a team where people trust in not being
blamed for failure, where it is possible to openly communicate and discuss failure,
they should feel less pressured to act defensively. We hypothesize that a positive
approach to failure will be associated with a lower number of defensive decisions:
Hypothesis 1 A more constructive approach to failure negatively correlates with
the number of defensive decisions.
2.2 Employee voice
‘‘If you see something, say something.’’ This idea appears simple, yet, in many
organizations, speaking up about something that causes concern is far from being
perceived as simple. The term employee voice refers to informal and discretionary
communication by an employee regarding ideas, suggestions, concerns, or opinions
about work-related issues to superiors who might be able to take appropriate action.
The intent is to bring about improvement or change (Detert and Burris 2007; Fast
et al. 2014; LePine and Van Dyne 1998; Morrison 2011; Tangirala and Ramanujam
2008). It is a form of extra-role upward communication behavior that, albeit
constructive in intent, challenges and seeks to alter the status quo (Dyne et al. 2003).
Employee voice has been associated with organizational learning, improved work
processes, innovation, error correction, the curtailment of illegal or immoral
behavior, and crisis prevention (Detert and Edmondson 2011; Detert and Trevin˜o
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2010; Grant 2013; LePine and Van Dyne 2001; Liang et al. 2012; Morrison and
Milliken 2000; Tangirala and Ramanujam 2008, 2012).
We argue that envrionments in which employees feel comfortable voicing their
observations and opinions to their superiors can diminish defensive decision
making. First, when employees are able to raise their concerns and speak up about
problems, management and team members in such organizations are more aware of
problems, risks, and uncertainties associated with decision alternatives. This in turn
should lower the pressure on the individual to engage in defensive decision making.
Second, a defensive decision will much more likely be demasked before it is
executed, as there is a higher chance of team members and subordinates raising
concerns about the appropriateness of defensive alternatives. This may lead to fewer
possibilities to ‘‘cover one’s ass.’’ We, therefore, hypothesize that employee voice
will be negatively associated with defensive decision making.
Hypothesis 2 Employee voice negatively correlates with the number of defensive
decisions.
The model (Fig. 1) illustrates the hypotheses where changes in approach to
failure and employee voice both affect defensive decision making.
3 Methods
We collected data from across a large German public administration with six
consecutive levels of hierarchy, each with personnel responsibility. The head of
each section was invited to participate in the study via a formal email from the head
of the administration’s own academy that provides leadership education. The
invitation highlighted that the study has the potential to improve decision processes
in the administration. Each head was asked to disseminate the invitation to
subordinates at the next hierarchy level with personnel responsibility who in turn
should disseminate the email to their subordinates, continuing the cycle until the
invitation reaches the lowest hierarchy level with personnel responsibility. This
cascading process likely caused some attrition on each hierarchy level, where a
certain proportion of those who received the invitation did not disseminate it to the
following level. Besides attrition, there was possibly a self-selection bias at work,
even though we guaranteed anonymity. Superiors who responded to the study before
forwarding the invitation might have had a preference that the organization overall
achieves a good performance. Those who feared that their subordinates would
report many defensive decisions might, therefore, have shied away from sending
out the invitation. This implies that the results are likely a conservative estimate.
Fig. 1 Model
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There are about 20,000 managers with personnel responsibility in the
organization. If we assume a constant attrition rate for each of the six hierarchy
levels of 10% as the lowest likely rate, the total number of those who received
the invitation is about 2700; if we assume a 50% attrition rate, it is about
1500. Of those who received the invitation, 950 participated in the study
(Table 1).
For confidentiality reasons, we did not collect data that differentiates
sections. Of the participants, 33% had personnel responsibility for up to 10
employees, 41% for 10 to 50 employees, and 26% for more than 50 employees.
The participants had significant experience in their field, with 45% having
worked in their current division for more than 10 years. There were 59% male
and 41% female participants; the modal age was above 50 years. Of the 950
participants, 327 (34%) indicated that their work is direcly influenced by the
elected local govnerment (which we will refer to subsequently as politics). The
questionnaire lasted on average 15.5 min (SD = 19.1).
The questionnaire contained four sections. Section one measured the extent of
managers’ defensive decision making. Section two provided a set of questions from
which we derived four scales: approach to failure, employee voice, and two scales
that served as control variables. Section three contained three open questions asking
participants to indicate what they perceived to be (a) a central reason for defensive
decision making, (b) an example of defensive decision making, and (c) a measure
that reduces defensive decision making. Finally, section four concluded with
demographics and questions concerning the background of participants. Answers to
sections one and two were mandatory, whereas those in sections three and four were
optional.
3.1 Measures
In order to measure the extent of defensive decisions, we asked participants to
respond to the following question:








Not stated - 7 227
Total 950
Level 1 is the highest level and 6 the lowest, ‘not stated - 7’ are those participants who did not indicate
their hierarchy level
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Decisions in organizations are frequently characterized by the fact that the
decision maker does not choose the option that is best for the organization but
instead chooses the option that protects him or herself from potentially
negative future consequences. This is called a ‘defensive decision’.
How many of the 10 most important decisions you made within the last
12 months had a defensive component?
This measure focuses on the most important decisions where even one single
defensive decision can imply significant costs for the organization. It asks
participants to consider a limited number of concrete and important decisions.
This facilitates recall and accurate response. At the same time, it provides a
conservative estimate in the face of the fact that decision makers, if anything, are
likely to underreport in spite of assured anonymity. It also can serve as a basis to
estimate the potential costs of defensive decision by providing a concrete number
of how many of the most important decisions were defensive.
A team’s approach to failure can be captured by combining elements of team
psychological safety (Edmondson 1999) and error culture (van Dyck et al.
2005) translated to the team’s level. In order to develop the scale, we used five out
of the seven items from Edmondson (1999) and three pre-tested items for capturing
error culture at the team level. We measured employee voice using the three items
from Detert and Burris (2007). In addition, we explored two further scales as
controls: We measured job satisfaction with three items. Because defensive
decisions necessitate that managers think that they know the goals of the
organization and are able to derive from this which option is best, we used three
items to measure awareness of goals.
Given that both dependent and independent variables are from the same self-
reports, there is a risk of a common method bias. To reduce it, we carefully designed
and administered the survey. We explicitly affirmed that participants’ comments
would be held confidential from both the researchers and the organization’s
managers. This ensures that participants are less likely to give socially desirable
responses. To assess the factor structures of approach to failure, employee voice, job
satisfaction, and goals, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis testing the
impact of a common method bias (Bentler and Dudgeon 1996; Hu and Bentler
1999). First, we specified a measurement model for the four variables under study in
which all indicators loaded on their respective latent constructs, using the
comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index (NFI), and root-mean-square error
of approximation (RMSEA) to assess fit. Before constructing scale scores we
deleted all items with negative standardized loadings. The structure achieved
adequate fit with the data [v2 (119) = 745, v2/df = 6.2, CFI = 0.87, NFI = 0.85,
RMSEA = 0.07] (Hooper et al. 2008). All factor loadings were p\ 0.001 and
ranged for approach to failure from 0.43 to 0.74, for employee voice from 0.71 to
0.87, for job satisfaction from 0.62 to 0.77 and for goals from 0.61 to 0.89. In a
second step, we compared these fit indices with a one-factor model in which all
indicators loaded on one latent variable. The fit indices showed a poor model fit [v2
(119) = 2735, v2/df = 23.0, CFI = 0.47, NFI = 0.46, RMSEA = 0.15]. These
analyses provided support for the expected factor structure of the variables and
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for there being no strong underlying component that explains the variance in our
data.
3.1.1 Approach to failure
The construct was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (I do not agree at
all) to 7 (I fully agree). Items marked with an asterisk are taken from Edmondson
(1999):
(1) Members of this team are able to bring up problems and tough issues.*
(2) It is safe to take a risk in this team.*
(3) It is difficult to ask other members of this team for help.*
(4) No one on this team would deliberately act in a way that undermines my
efforts.*
(5) Working with members of this team, my unique skills and talents are valued
and utilized.*
(6) If an error is detected in my team, the first thing to do is to search for the
person who is responsible.
(7) If an error is detected in my team, the most important thing is to search for
ways to resolve this problem better in the future.
(8) If someone from my team makes an error, he or she would be well advised to
hide it.
The estimated reliability was a ¼ 0:74.
3.1.2 Employee voice
Furthermore, we measured employee voice as introduced by Detert and Burris
(2007) on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 7 (almost always).
(1) I give [manager’s name] suggestions about how to make this work unit better,
even if others disagree.
(2) I challenge [manager’s name] to deal with problems around here.
(3) I speak up to [manager’s name] with ideas to address employees’ needs and
concerns.
The estimated reliability was a ¼ 0:82.
3.1.3 Job satisfaction
Next, we inquired about job satisfaction. The construct was measured on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 7 (almost always).
(1) In my position I feel that my skills are appropriately put to use.
(2) I am very motivated to perform my tasks.
(3) I am very satisfied with the results of my work.
The estimated reliability was a ¼ 0:73.
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3.1.4 Goals
Last, we asked whether the goals of the organization are well known on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (I do not agree at all) to 7 (I fully agree).
(1) I know the goals and objectives of my organization.
(2) The contribution of my work to the goals and objectives of my organization is
clear.
(3) I support the goals and objectives of my organization.
The estimated reliability was a ¼ 0:82.
3.2 Qualitative statements
We asked participants to indicate what in their opinion is an important reason for
defensive decision making, to provide an example, and to name a possible
countermeasure to reduce defensive decisions. Out of the 950 participants, 561
indicated a cause, of which 513 relate to defensive decision making; 386 provided
an example, of which 298 relate to defensive decision making; and 418 a
countermeasure, of which 345 relate to defensive decision making. All these
statements were read by two raters. Both raters initially independently developed
categories that capture the content of a statement. Together they compared these
categories and established the main ones. After re-reading the statements, they
independently categorized each. If a participant made multiple statements, the raters
identified the main category touched upon by the participant. Inter-rater reliability
was high, with 91% agreement. Where there were differences, the raters discussed
these and agreed on a category.
4 Results
4.1 Overview
Table 2 provides the correlation between the constructs and the dependent variable
defensive decision making. It indicates that the main explanatory variables, team’s
approach to failure and employee voice, are negatively correlated with defensive
decision making (p\ 0.001).
4.2 Defensive decision making
How widespread is defensive decision making? Figure 2 plots for each hierarchy
level from level 1 (top level) to level 6 (lowest level with personnel responsibility)
and 7 (missing information about hierarchy level). At each hierarchy, level
defensive decisions are widespread. On average, 2.5 (SD = 2.1) out of 10 decisions
are defensive. Overall, 80% of managers indicated that they made at least one
defensive decision and 17% state that at least half of all their decisions were
defensive.
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How do a team’s approach to failure and employee voice relate to the number of
defensive decisions? Table 2 shows the OLS regression with defensive decision
making (DDM) as the dependent variable; model 1 and 2 list the controls and model
3 adds approach to failure and employee voice. Consistent with hypothesis 1, a more
constructive approach to failure is associated with a lower number of defensive
decisions. In line with hypothesis 2, higher levels of employee voice are negatively
associated with the number of defensive decisions.
A number of other variables are associated with the number of defensive
decisions people take. The more participants are satisfied with their job, the fewer
defensive decisions they make. Whereas older managers tend to make more
defensive decisions, defensive decisions decline with increasing years of experience
in a given area. As we will return to later, note that defensive decisions do not vary
according to whether or not participants work is directly influenced by politics.
We also estimated a model that includes employee voice as a moderator.
However, the model fits the data worse than do the models presented in Table 3.
Fig. 2 Number of defensive decisions out of 10 for each hierarchy level. Violin plot showing
distributions as well as mean and ± 1 standard deviation, 1–6 indicate the hierarchy levels, 7 indicates
that a participant did not provide a hierarchy level
Table 2 Correlation between constructs
DDM Approach to failure Employee voice Satisfaction
Approach to failure - 0.31 (\ 0.001)
Employee voice - 0.15 (\ 0.001) 0.17 (\ 0.001)
Satisfaction - 0.22 (\ 0.001) 0.36 (\ 0.001) 0.23 (\ 0.001)
Goals - 0.17 (\ 0.001) 0.28 (\ 0.001) 0.10 (\ 0.001) 0.42 (\ 0.001)
P-values in parentheses, DDM denotes defensive decision-making
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4.3 Qualitative analysis
Figure 3 provides an overview of the examples participants gave for a defensive
decision, why they thought that defensive decisions occur (causes), and possible
countermeasures. The Figure shows that the relative frequency with which a
category features in these responses differs strongly among examples, causes, and
countermeasures. For instance, the avoidance of conflicts is the single most
frequently mentioned motive in the examples, comprising 35% of them. However,
when we asked participants directly what they think causes defensive decisions,
conflict avoidance was only mentioned in 23% of the causes and features in only
12% of the countermeasures. Similarly, 11% of all participants indicated, mainly
with reference to colleagues but not with regard to themselves, that people are afraid
and therefore make defensive decisions. However, 0% of the examples relate to
someone being overly afraid. The examples reported by participants relate to direct
experiences that they had with defensive decisions. Causes and countermeasures are
more abstract and have to be inferred. It suggests that examples possibly provide a
more accurate picture of the occurrence of defensive decisions.
The main categories are as follows. Of the examples, 35% relate to ‘avoiding
conflict’ and concern the relationship to peers or to subordinates. A prototypical
statement is the following:
I had to decide whether to hold onto a certain senior manager in my team until
the end of his term or whether to find a position for him in another team. I was
Table 3 OLS regression with defensive decision making (DDM) as dependent variable
DDM (1) DDM (2) DDM (3)
B se p B se p B se p
(Intercept) 3.92 0.59 \ 0.001 7.37 0.74 \ 0.001 9.55 0.78 \ 0.001
Hierarchy level - 0.03 0.05 0.538 - 0.07 0.05 0.140 - 0.08 0.05 0.073
Work influenced by
politics
- 0.15 0.16 0.361 - 0.15 0.15 0.320 - 0.08 0.15 0.589
Number of
subordinates
- 0.10 0.08 0.179 - 0.06 0.07 0.415 - 0.01 0.07 0.842
Years of experience 0.20 0.09 0.027 0.22 0.09 0.013 0.20 0.08 0.017
Age - 0.29 0.11 0.009 - 0.32 0.11 0.004 - 0.23 0.11 0.030
Gender - 0.14 0.15 0.340 - 0.12 0.15 0.400 - 0.13 0.14 0.344
Satisfaction - 0.14 0.03 \ 0.001 - 0.08 0.03 0.003
Goals - 0.05 0.02 0.011 - 0.03 0.02 0.103
Approach to failure - 0.07 0.01 \ 0.001
Employee voice - 0.05 0.02 0.009
Observations 853 853 853
R2/adj. R2 0.016/.009 0.077/.068 0.133/.122
The number of observations was 853 out of 950 because the disclosure of the control variables was
optional. The results are qualitatively identical if one uses the full sample of 950 participants but omits the
control variables
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pretty confident that keeping him here would have severe negative
consequences for other team members and for the services that we provide.
In the end, I decided defensively and kept him because I was shying away
from the conflict. As a result, parts of the services that we provide have stalled
for the last 16 months and parts of the team are dissolving as team members
are seeking employment elsewhere and new opportunities cannot be realized.
‘Not resisting pressure from superiors’ refers to the relationship to superiors as a
source of defensive decisions. It features in 19% of the examples. A prototypical
statement is the following:
When recruiting a new employee we had to decide between an internal
applicant and an external applicant who was better qualified. There was some
uncertainty how well they would perform but I was pretty confident that the
external candidate would do a better job. However, due to pressure from
superiors I offered the position to the internal candidate.
An example for ‘lack of motivation’ (4%) is the following:
We continued to rely on an external IT support even though the service was
very bad. We did hope that they might improve but in the end we stayed with
them. We should have made the effort to look for an alternative external IT
support.
An example for a defensive decision due to ‘lack of resources’ (13%),
which often relates to insufficient number of staff, is the following:
There are often long waiting times for an appointment with the public health
office, but you can never be quite sure about it. I therefore do not send my
employees even though it would be in the best interest of the team.
Lack of staff not only slows down processes but it can also lead to a ‘lack of
information’ (3%) and in turn to defensive decision-making, as the following
illustrates:
Fig. 3 Statements by participants
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Due to staff shortages, there is insufficient time to thoroughly examine the
facts so that there are uncertainties about the consequences of this decision.
Therefore, decisions are delayed or taken defensively.
When naming examples, participants pointed mainly to psychological elements,
which characterize 64% of the examples: avoiding conflict, not resisting pressure
from superiors, and lack of motivation. Lack of resources or information, in
contrast, accounts for only 20% of the examples. Most managers, unlike most
physicians, do not consider legal consequences as an important driver for defensive
decisions. This emphasis on psychological causes for defensive decisions contrasts
with the countermeasures that participants believe could help: 49% of participants
think that more information or more resources could effectively address defensive
decisions. However, merely increasing resources is unlikely to address the
psychological underpinnings that many of the examples for defensive decisions
show.
An important element in the operation of the public administration is the
influence of politics: 9% of all examples and 14% of all the statements on the causes
of defensive decision making point to the intersection with politics, distributed
mainly between the categories avoiding conflict and not resisting pressure from
superiors. Note that more participants pointed to politics when they speculated
about causes; fewer provided explicit examples of defensive decisions where
politics features.
4.4 Discussion
The results clearly show the prevalence of defensive decisions across all hierarchy
levels of the organization. Similar to the medical domain, we find that 80% of
managers readily admitted to having decided defensively, compared to 93% of
physicians (Studdert et al. 2005). On average, one in four of the most important
decisions in the last 12 months was defensive. Note that this is a conservative
estimate because managers, if anything, are likely to underreport. These numbers
suggest that defensive decision making should be of central concern for
organizations. Key determinants for such decision making in the organization are
the prevalent approach to failure and employee voice. The qualitative results also
highlight that avoiding conflict is a key element in defensive decision making. Such
avoidance of conflicts can be diminished if a team takes a more constructive
approach to failure and encourages employee voice.
Defensive decision making can overlap with organizational silence, which is
characterized by employees not daring to speak up to superiors about problems or
issues (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Such an overlap can be the case in the
examples that pertain to not resisting the pressure from superiors. If the employee
keeps silent and actively decides in favor of the second-best option, such as in the
case of not taking the better, external candidate, such a decision contains both
motives. If the employee actively engages with superiors and still decides to opt for
the second-best option, organizational silence is no longer present as a motive but
only defensive decision making. Defensive decisions due to pressure from superiors
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are difficult to eliminate unless one can convince superiors to minimize pressure and
to create a psychologically safe environment where employees are granted
sufficient autonomy to make decisions in the face of risk and uncertainty.
Some of the examples (9%) and causes (14%) point to politics as a driver of
defensive decision making. However, the regression analysis does not indicate that
politics has a significant effect on defensive decision making. A possible
explanation for these results is that managers pointed to politics as a scapegoat
for their defensive decisions. The difference between the number of examples and
the frequency with which politics appears in the causes could also be attributed to
such scapegoating.
Participants cite the lack of information as a possible countermeasure to
defensive decisions. More information diminishes uncertainty but is often available
only after the fact. At the same time, the regression analysis shows that extensive
experience is associated with fewer defensive decisions. It is probably fair to
assume that the more experience a manager has in an area, the lower the degree of
uncertainty.
We conducted a correlational analysis between defensive decisions, approach to
failure, employee voice, and the control variables. When we explicitly asked
participants to point to causes and countermeasures, such statements show some
inconsistency in comparison to the categories that featured in the examples. An
experiment would clarify the causal relationship.
5 Conclusion
Our results suggest that creating a constructive approach to failure and encouraging
voice will help significantly in lowering the impact of defensive decision making in
an organization. Central steps to achieving this are the acceptance and open
discussion of the inherent uncertainty of many decisions, the establishment of a
positive error culture, and the creation of a team climate that allows people to feel
psychologically safe and speak up when they see problems or have concerns about a
particular alternative.
A first step is to emphasize that a decision can fail even it it relies on the best and
most reliable process because of the risk and uncertainty inherent to the
environment in which managers operate. Accepting failures as a natural part of
work and communicating them should encourage people to explore and experiment
more broadly. Open communication encourages learning from failure—without it,
team members can learn solely from their own mistakes. As a second step, it is
important to incentivize process quality and not outcome quality, given that the
latter cannot be controlled by the decision maker. A focus on the quality of the
process can generate the best solutions in the long run and also foster effective
organizational learning. A good process can be characterized by basing decisions on
the best evidence available and by basing decisions that involve uncertainty on the
key factors that provide a robust foundation in the face of the unknown (Artinger
et al. 2015).
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Defensive decisions can generate severe costs. In the health care sector in the US,
an estimated 30% of total spending is due to defensive decisions (Jackson
Healthcare, 2009). Corresponding estimates for the corporate sector are missing.
However, for every 1% loss in corporate income due to defensive decision making,
German corporations would lose 1.78 billion euros in primary income annually
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017). An open research question is a cost–benefit
analysis of the effect of reducing defensive decisions. Note that the costs of
reducing defensive decision making can be relatively small; countermeasures such
as trainings in psychological safety, positive error culture, and employee voice are
relatively cheap. A first step could be to implement trainings initially at the very top
of the hierarchy, where defensive decisions create the largest losses and determine
here costs and benefits. From the feedback that we have received so far, we believe
that many organizations will achieve significant net gains.
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